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THE TRUTH ABOUT WOMEN'S RIGHTS
JANET BENSHOOF"
In their article, The Rise and Fall of Women's Rights: Have
Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom Forfeited Victory?, the authors
Lynne Marie Kohm and Colleen Holmes launch a wide-ranging
attack on women's reproductive freedoms and target not only
myself but topics as diverse as gay and lesbian rights, the Vagina
Monologues, and sexual freedom (without guilt or shame) for
women.
This Essay is not meant to be a comprehensive response to the
article. Rather, this Essay will counter Kohm's and Holmes's
asserted premise-that fighting for reproductive freedoms has left
feminists without the strength to fight for other rights. By doing so,
the authors' true agenda will be revealed. I trust that the reader's
own common sense will lend a healthy skepticism to an examina-
tion of the article's other and, at times, even more egregious claims.
This Essay will establish the centrality of reproductive rights
to women's equality and will describe the well-financed, politically
sophisticated, and increasingly successful attack on those rights by
the religious right. The goal of the religious right is to remove the
constitutional protections embodying the values of a pluralistic
secular government, to disparage the constitutional values of
individual conscientious choice, to halt the advancement of a living
constitution toward the protection of equality, and instead to
substitute one religious viewpoint as the state-sponsored ideology.
A key component to their overall strategy is an attack on the right
to choose abortion. Thus, it is imperative that feminists continue
to fight the numerous encroachments that are being made on
women's reproductive freedoms.
The last part of this Essay is drawn from remarks I made at
the Third Annual Blackmun Lecture, Countering the Religious
Right: Legislative and Legal Strategies, on March 5,1999, in Wash-
ington D.C., presented by the Center for Reproductive Law and
Policy (CRLP) and the People for the American Way Foundation.
* President & Founder, Center for Reproductive Law and Policy (CRLP), a non-profit
legal and policy advocacy organization dedicated to promoting women's reproductive rights.
CRLP's domestic and international programs engage in litigation, policy analysis, legal
research, and public education seeking to achieve women's equality in society and ensure
that all women have access to appropriate and freely chosen reproductive health services.
I would like to thank Jennifer Lemberg for her assistance in the preparation of this Essay.
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I.
Kohm and Holmes assert at the start of their article that
feminists have sacrificed their commitment to women's economic
security in order to safeguard women's reproductive rights.' As a
result, according to the authors, women have not made the strides
toward economic equality that the authors expected. The authors
lay the blame for this failure squarely on pro-choice feminists who,
according to the authors, must take responsibility for the gap
between men's and women's salaries and the glass ceiling that halts
women's professional progress.2
Even a cursory examination of the article reveals that the
authors fail to provide any demonstrable proof of their initial
sweeping assertion. Instead, they rely on the naive and unsup-
portable assertion that any time or attention given to reproductive
freedom actually harms other types of work for gender equality, and
that an interest in reproductive rights, by its very nature, "gobble [s]
up and swallow [s]" all of the "other aspects of equality.'3
The authors ignore the numerous advancements in women's
legal equality achieved by feminists, including those in organiza-
tions that stress pro-choice legal work. These advancements in
economic and educational equality for women, as well as enhanced
protections from gender-related violence, were achieved by women's
organizations, concerned state and federal lawmakers, and
courageous individuals and are in no way undermined by ongoing
reproductive rights work. In fact, the interconnectedness of the
advocates for all types of advances for women (reproductive,
economic, and protection against violence) demonstrates the
centrality of the ability to make reproductive choices to any equality
gains. For example, how can a woman earn a living or compete in
a sports scholarship in college if she cannot control her reproduc-
tion?
In 1994, federal legislators passed the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA).' VAWA gives "[aill persons within the United States
1. See Lynne Marie Kohm & Colleen Holmes, The Rise and Fall of Women's Rights:
Have Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom Forfeited Victory?, 6 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L.
381,381-82(2000).
2. See id. at 381-87.
3. Id. at 398; see also id. at 385 (equating concern that medical schools do not teach
abortion with a lack of concern over the number of women entering the medical profession);
id. at 406 (equating doctors' concern for diagnosing fetal defects with doctors' neglect of
domestic violence).
4. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001-40703,108 Stat.
1796, 1902-55 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
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. . . the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender."5 Individuals injured by gender motivated crimes of
violence may sue their attackers for damages and other appropriate
relief." VAWA also earmarks substantial federal funds for use in
preventing violence against women,7 makes it a federal crime to
commit certain types of violence against women,8 and enhances
penalties for federal crimes committed because of a gender animus.9
VAWA's laudable effort to protect women from violence is
currently under constitutional attack. The National Organization
for Women's Legal Defense and Education Fund (NOW LDEF), an
organization criticized by Kohm and Holmes,'0 is currently defend-
ing VAWA's constitutionality, in part, by participating in the appeal
of the Fourth Circuit case of Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
Institute & State University." In Brzonkala, the Fourth Circuit
declared that parts of VAWA are unconstitutional. 2 The United
States Supreme Court recently accepted certiorari in the case.'"
Additionally, the amicus list in Brzonkala is quite extensive and
includes a number of national and local organizations that fight for
employment equality and economic security for women 14 - organi-
zations that Kohm and Holmes overlooked in their article.'5
5. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994).
6. See id. § 13981(c).,
7. See id. §§ 300w-10, 3796gg, 10402(a) (1994).
8. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261, 2262 (1994) (punishing those who cross state lines to commit
domestic violence or to violate a protective order).
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994) (enumerating sentencing guidelines and enhanced
penalties for hate crimes).
10. See Kohm & Holmes, supra note 1, at 382 n.5, 395-96 & n.99, 412 nn.207-08.
11. 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 1999 U.S. Lexis 4745 (Sept. 28, 1999); see
also NOW LDEF, Complete Listing of Recent Cases (visited Jan. 20, 2000)
<http'/www.nowldef.org/html/courts/docket.htm> (listing additional VAWA cases NOW
LDEF is litigating).
12. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 826.
13. See supra note 11.
14. The amicus list includes law professors, The Anti-Defamation League, Center for
Women Policy Studies, The DC Rape Crisis Center, Equal Rights Advocates, The Georgetown
University Law Center Sex Discrimination Clinic, Independent Women's Forum, Jewish
Women International, The National Alliance of Sexual Assault Coalitions, The National
Coalition Against Domestic Violence, The National Coalition Against Sexual Assault, The
National Network to End Domestic Violence, National Organization for Women, Northwest
Women's Law Center, The Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Virginia
National Organization for Women, Virginia NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Virginians Aligned Against Sexual Assault, Women Employed, Women's Freedom Network,
Women's Law Project, and Women's Legal Defense Fund. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 821.
15. For example, Equal Rights Advocates is a highly regarded national organization that
"works to achieve women's economic security through litigation, public education, legislative
advocacy, public policy analysis and advice & counseling." Equal Rights Advocates, Home
Page (visited Jan. 20, 2000) <httpl/www.equalrights.org/>. As stated on its website, Equal
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In 1993, Congress enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA).'6 The FMLA granted employees the right to take twelve
weeks leave from their jobs for family or medical reasons with the
guarantee that, at the end of their leave, they could return to their
prior position or an equivalent position without any loss of
benefits. 7 In passing the FMLA, Congress made several significant
findings:
(2) it is important for the development of children and the
family unit that fathers and mothers be able to participate in
early childrearing and the care of family members who have
serious health conditions;
(3) the lack of employment policies to accommodate
working parents can force individuals to choose between job
security and parenting;
(5) due to the nature of the roles of men and women in our
society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often
falls on women, and such responsibility affects the working lives
of women more than it affects the working lives of men; and
(6) employment standards that apply to one gender only
have serious potential for encouraging employers to discrimi-
nate against employees and applicants for employment who are
of that gender."s
In light of these findings, Congress passed the FMLA in order to
ensure gender equality in the workplace, stating that the purposes
of the FMLA are:
(1) to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs
of families, to promote the stability and economic security of
families, and to promote national interests in preserving family
integrity;
(2) to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for
Rights Advocates "focuses on: welfare reform that leads to self-sufficiency, promoting equal
opportunity/affirmative action for all women and girls, stopping sexual harassment in the
workplace and at school, [and) improving the terms and conditions of women's employment,
including the balance between family and work responsibilities." Id.
In direct contradiction to Kohm's and Holmes's assertion that women's rights activists pay
only minimal attention to the wage gap between men and women, see Kohm & Holmes, supra
note 1, at 384, the Equal Rights Advocates has participated in litigating a number of cases
related to the Equal Pay Act. See Equal Rights Advocates, Relevant Cases (visited Jan. 20,
2000) <http-J/www.equalrights.org/LEGAJAMICUSBRhtm>.
16. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, Title I, § 101, 107 Stat. 7
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654) (1994).
17. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2614.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a).
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medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the
care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health
condition;
(4) to accomplish the purposes described in paragraphs (1)
and (2) in a manner that, consistent with the Equal Protection*
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment minimizes the potential
for employment discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring
generally that leave is available for eligible medical reasons
(including maternity-related disability) and for compelling
family reasons, on a gender-neutral basis; and
(5) to promote the goal of equal employment opportunity
for women and men, pursuant to such clause.19
Lastly, Congress prohibited interference with employees' rights
under the FMLA and discrimination based on the exercise of those
rights.'0 The FMLA largely was drafted by feminist lawyers from
the National Partnership for Women and Families (formerly
Women's Legal Defense Fund),21 who also do reproductive choice
work.
As another example of feminists' recent advancements for
women, in 1998 and 1999, legislators in nine states passed contra-
ceptive equity laws that prohibit medical insurance plans that
provide coverage for prescription drugs, devices, and/or outpatient
services from excluding prescription contraceptives, devices, or
outpatient services from their coverage.2 The laws were passed in
response to the fact that women of reproductive age spend sixty-
eight percent more money than men on out-of-pocket health care
costs based largely on the sums women pay for reproductive health
19. 1d § 2601(b).
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 2616.
21. See Donna R. Lenhoff, Reflections on Five Years of the FMLA, NATL PARTNERSHIP
FOR WOMEN & FAm. NEWSLErrER (Nat Partnership for Women & Families, Washington,
D.C.), Summer/Fall 1998, at <http'/lwww.nationalpartnership.org/news/newaletter/
fa198/newsletter3.htm> (describing the development of the FMLA).
22. See S.H.B. 5950, Jan. Reg. Seas., 1999 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. No. 99-79 (West); H.B.
374, 145th Gen. Assem., 1999-00 Reg. Bess. (Ga. 1999) (enacted and codified at GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-24-59.6 (Supp. 1999)); S.B. 822, 20th Leg., Reg. Sea. (Haw. 1999) (enacted and
codified at HAW. REV. STAT. § 432:1-604.5 (1999)); S.P. 389, 119th Leg., 1st Reg. Seas. (Me.
1999) (enacted and codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2332-J (West Supp. 1999) and
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 2756, 2847-G, 4245 (West Supp. 1999)); H.B. 457., Reg.
Seas., 1998 Md. Laws 117 (enacted and codified at MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826 (Supp.
1999)); A.B. 60,70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 1999); S.B. 175,166th Leg., 1st Gen. Seass. (N.H.
1999) (enacted and codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 415:18-i, 420-A.17-c, 420-B:8-gg
(Supp. 1999)); S.B. 90, Reg. Seas., 1999 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 231 (enacted and codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-3-176, 58-50-155 (1999)); H.B. 189, 65th Leg., Reg. Seas. (Vt. 1999)
(enacted and codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4099c (Supp. 1999)).
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services' and the fact that most insurance plans routinely exclude
contraceptives from coverage.' Thus, contraceptive equity laws
work to promote economic equality between the sexes. My organi-
zation, along with many other women's rights organizations,
actively promoted these bills.
- In the courts over the last twenty-five years, feminists have
achieved advances in economic areas for women while suffering
losses in the area of reproductive rights. In recent years, the Court
issued a number of opinions that clarified the standards for
employer liability for sexual discrimination under Title VII,2"
reasserted the principle that states may not fund male-only
colleges,2" and opened the door to suits against schools under Title
IX for failing to protect their students from sexual harassment at
school.27 Lastly, the Court spoke assertively on the right-of states
to proscribe discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.2"
Many women's rights organizations and courageous individual
women participated in these suits.
This brief and very cursory overview of some current efforts to
ensure women's economic and educational equality and safety
unquestionably belies Kohm's and Holmes's assertion that "the
current women's rights movement has promoted a feminist agenda
23. See WOMEN'S RESEARCH & EDUC. INST., WOMEN'S HEALTH INSURANCE COSTS AND
EXPERIENCE 8, 16-17 (1994).
24. Forty-nine percent of large-group plans do not routinely cover any contraceptive
method and only 15% of the plans cover all five of the most common reversible contraceptive
methods--oral contraceptives, diaphragms, Depo-Provera, IUDs, and Norplant. See ALAN
GurTMACHER INST., UNEVEN & UNEQUAL 13-14 (1994). Whereas 97% of large-group plans
cover prescription drugs, only 33% of these plans cover oral contraceptives, the most popular
reversible birth control method among American women. Whereas 92% of large-group plans
cover prescription devices, only 15% of these plans cover diaphragms, 18% cover IUDs, and
24% cover Norplant. See id. at 11, 16.
25. See, e.g., Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999) (clarifying
standard for punitive damages); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)
(clarifying employer's vicarious liability for a hostile work environment); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (same); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75 (1998) (holding that same sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII);
Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202 (1997) (discussing whether
employer met minimum employee requirement for Title VII liability); Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (clarifying standard for abusive work environment claims).
26. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that state violates Equal
Protection Clause by maintaining a military college exclusively for men).
27. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999) (permitting
student to sue school under Title IX for failure to remedy a classmate's harassment);
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (permitting student to sue school
for damages under Title IX for sexual harassment by teacher).
28. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that Colorado's amendment to its
constitution barring all state and local action designed to protect the status of persons based
on sexual orientation violated the federal Equal Protection Clause).
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that has focused solely on reproductive freedom to the detriment or
exclusion of freedom and equality for women in other areas."29,
II.
By basing their article on the false and inflammatory premise
that women's economic equality is being sacrificed by women's
desire for reproductive freedom, the authors try to camouflage their
underlying attempt to legitimate, through academic discourse and
scare tactics, their own discomfort with abortion and female
sexuality due to their personal religious views. 0
Although the article focuses primarily on abortion, the authors
do spend substantial portions of their article discussing other topics
including what they consider to be vulgar displays by feminists,
such as the Vagina Monologues,3 1 and what they consider to be
feminist defenses of vulgarity, such as feminists' refusal to support
the impeachment of President Clinton based on his affair with
Monica Lewinsky."2 The authors also comment negatively on
lesbian rights,' same sex partnerships," sex for pleasure,35 sex
outside marriage," adultery,"7 pornography,"' witchcraft,39 and
goddess worship (which somehow includes the use of "dark sexual
power").'
The authors' decision to devote large portions of an article on
so-called harmful influences within the feminist movement to
various aspects of female sexuality illustrates their discomfort with,
and ultimately their attempt to deny, female sexual desire. The
authors' unexplained inclusion of such a wide range of diverse
topics, seemingly unrelated to each other, demonstrates their own
29. Kohm & Holmes, supra note 1, at 381-82.
30. The authors' personal discomfort with a wide range of issues related to female
sexuality is driven by their religious views. The authors make repeated references to biblical
doctrine and plead with feminists to return to the faith of earlyfeministo. See id. at 387,389,
392, 402, 414-15 n.218. I will discuss the danger and the consequences of the authors'
attempt to disguise their personal and religious discomfort with sexuality with the
inflammatory statement that reproductive rights work sets women back near the end of this
Essay. See infra notes 86-113 and accompanying text.
31. See Kohmr & Holmes, supra note 1, at 407.
32. See io. at 405-06.
33. See id. at 395 n.92.
34. See id. at 411 n.201.
35. See id. at 407.
36. See id. at 411.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 408.
39. See id. at 418.
40. See id
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obsession with, and fear of, female sexuality and desire. Seeing sex
everywhere, the authors fail to notice that they have failed to prove
their underlying premise."'
III.
The authors conclude their discussion of female sexuality by
proposing that women embrace the theory of "complimentarity"
2
and, thereby, reject all aspects of female sexuality except for those
that fit within the authors' idea of"complimentarity." At the heart
of the authors' "complimentarity" thesis is the concept that women
should be defined by their maternal capacity."0 Thus, the authors'
call for "complimentarity" merely reinforces the stereotype of
motherhood being the primary proper role for women-a stereotype
that the movement for equality (including reproductive freedom) is
trying to combat.
Under "complimentarism," both women and men would limit
themselves to "roles [to which] they are best suited given their own
natural inclinations, desires, and convictions."' Clearly, the
authors believe that the core of women's natural inclinations is
motherhood. Thus, central to their "complimentarity" thesis is
"'distinctive roles for men and women based primarily on women's
actual or potential maternity. 5 As for all other aspects of a
woman's sexuality not related to maternity, the authors merely
comment that '[ilt is the sometimes painful and exhilarating
discovery of God's power to fight free from the bondage of our sinful
selves." 0
By defining women by their maternal capacity, the authors
contradict their major criticism of the reproductive rights move-
ment. Throughout the first portion of their article, the authors
repeatedly state that the reproductive rights movement damages
women by improperly defining women by, and limiting women to,
their reproductive roles47 -a point I will refute shortly. Yet the
41. See supra text accompanying note 1.
42. See Kohm & Holmes, supra note 1, at 414.
43. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
44. Kohm & Holmes, supra note 1, at 419.
45. Id. at 416 (quoting OuLVE BANKS, FACES OF FEMINISM 77 (1981)); see also id. at 391
n.67 (touting the "privileges of motherhood"); id, at 421 (claiming that the "complimentarity"
model gives women 'familial ecstasy and fulfillment").
46. Id. at 416-17 (quoting John Piper, A Vision of Biblical Complimentarity, in
RECOvERiNG BIBLICAL MANHOOD & WOmANHOOD: A RESPONSE TO EVANGELUCAL FEMNISM
31, 47-48 (Wayne Gruden & John Piper eds., 1991)).
47. See id. at 384-85, 410-11, 418.
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authors then take the position that women should be defined by
their maternal function. The authors do not even attempt to
explain how their suggestion of defining women by their "maternal
function" is any different than defining women by their "reproduc-
tive function."
IV.
As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recognized in her plurality
opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,
[F] or two decades of economic and social developments, [women)
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that
define their views of themselves and their places in society, in
reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.49
Unless women in the United States continue to control their
childbearing capacity, they will not be able to participate fully in
society. Indeed, reproductive freedom is so central to women's
rights in general that over one hundred and eighty countries around
the world have declared "reproductive rights" to be a "human
right."
50
In the United States, the Supreme Court's privacy doctrine
grounds reproductive choice in concepts fundamental to individual
constitutional rights. In Casey, the Court noted that a woman's
constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy is based on two
48. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
49. Id, at 856.
50. These countries adopted the Programme of Action written in 1994 at the United
Nations' International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo. See
Report of the Int7 Conference on Population and Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 171/13
(1994). The Programme of Action states:
[Rieproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized
in national laws, international human rights documents and other [relevant
United Nations] consensus documents. These rights rest on the recognition of
the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the
number, spacing and timing of their children and to have the information and
means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and
reproductive health. It also includes their right to make decisions concerning
reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and violence ....
Id. 17.3. The Programme of Action further recognizes the centrality of reproductive rights
to women's empowerment. See id. 14.1.
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different and well-settled aspects of the right to privacy: the right
to decisional autonomy and the right to bodily integrity. 1 Thus, the
right to privacy guarantees that a woman can make intimate
decisions, including decisions about abortion, free from improper
government intrusion and also guarantees that a woman has
sufficient control of her own body that she will be free from
unwanted pregnancies.
In order to make sure that these guarantees are not empty
rhetoric at home and abroad, my organization, the Center for
Reproductive Law and Policy, works to ensure access to contracep-
tion and abortion, to support adolescent reproductive health care,
to guarantee that low-income women have access to a full range of
reproductive health care, and to counter violence against women's
reproductive freedom. 2
51. "It is settled now, as it was when the Court heard arguments in Roe v. Wade, that the
Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions
about family and parenthood, as well as bodily integrity." Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (citations
omitted); see also id. at 857 (stating that Roe is in "no jeopardy" because subsequent cases
recognized privacy rights in "intimate relations, fsmily, and whether or not to beget or bear
a child*).
52. For more details, see Center for Reprod. Law and Policy, Affirmative Plan for
Reproductive Rights (visited Jan. 20, 2000) <http'I/www.crlp.org/>.
As demonstrated by our work, we are deeply committed to women's health and safety,
contrary to Kohm's and Holmes's scandalous accusation. See Kohm & Holmes, supra note
1, at 404. The anti-choice movement, on the other hand, continues to place the pest-viability
fetus over women's health in violation of the Constitution, despite the Court's consistent
holding that it is impermissible for the State to do so. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 880 ("Mhe
essential holding of Roe forbids a State to interfere with a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion procedure if continuing her pregnancy would constitute a threat to her health.");
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-69
(1986) (finding that the challenged statute unconstitutionally required a "trade-off" between
a woman's health and fetal survival), overruled in part on other grounds, Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 400 (1979) (stating that during an abortion procedure, the physician's paramount duty
is to ensure the woman's health); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (holding that the
State must ensure, even post-viability, that the woman's health takes precedence); Jane L.
v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding unconstitutional a statute that
required the life of the fetus to be put before the life or health of the mother), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of
Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848, 868 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that the State may
regulate pest-viability abortions "as long as it does not interfere with medical judgments as
to the method necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the mother"), affd in part
& rev'd in part on other grounds, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
For example, neither the 1995 nor the 1997 federal bans on "partial birth abortion"
contains exceptions for a woman's health. See H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. (1997) (stating that
a partial birth abortion may be performed only to save a mother whose life is endangered by
a physical complication); H.R. 1833,104th Cong. (1995) (stating that partial birth abortions
can be performed only if necessary to save the life of the mother). Although both bans were
vetoed by President Clinton, see infra note 95 and accompanying text, the language of the
federal bans is used as the basis for most of the "partial birth abortion" bans passed by state
legislatures.
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For examples of state bans based on the 1997 federal language, see ALASKA STAT. §
18.16.050 (Lexis 1998), found unconstitutional in Planned Parenthoodv. Alaska, No. 3AN-97-
6019 CIV (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 1998); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.01 (West 1989
& Supp. 1999), found unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369
(D. Ariz. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 390.011-.0111 (West Supp. 2000), found unconstitutional
in A Choice for Women v. Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Fla. 1998); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-12-141, 16-12-144 (Lexis 1999), limited by Midtown Hosp. v. Miller, No. 1:97-CV-1786-
JOF (N.D. Ga. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 18-613 (Supp. 1999),found unconstitutional in Weyhrich
v. Lance, No. CV98-0117-S-BLW (D. Idaho Oct. 12, 1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/1, 5, 10,
15, 20, 99 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999), found unconstitutional in Hope Clinic v. Ryan' 995 F.
Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1998), vacated by 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68
U.S.L.W. 3461 (U. S. Jan. 10, 2000) (Nos. 99-1152 & 99-1156); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8A
(West 1993 & Supp. 1999), found unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 30 F.
Supp. 2d 1157 (S. D. Iowa 1998), affd, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
14:32.9, 40:1299.35.16 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000), permanently eqjoined by Causeway Med.
Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604 (E.D. La. 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.17016,
.17516 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999), permanently enjoined by Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp.
1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-401 (1999), found unconstitutional in
Intermountain Planned Parenthood v. Montana, No. BDV 97477 (Mont. Dist. Ct. June 29,
1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS H8 234.12-1 to-6 (1996 & Supp. 1999), enjoined by Rhode Island Med.
Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.R.I. 1999); W. VA. CODE §§ 3342-3, -8 (1996 &
Supp. 1999), temporarily enjoined by Brancazio v. Underwood, No. 2:98-0495, slip op. at 3
(S.D. W. Va. June 11, 1998).
For examples ofstate bans based on the 1995 federal language, see ALA. CODE §§ 26-23-1
to -6 (1992 & Supp. 1998); ARi. CODE ANN. §§ 5-61-201 to -204 (Michie 1997), found
unconstitutional in Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir.
1999); IND. CODEANN. § 16-34-2-1 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-326(7),
28-329 (1995), permanently enjoined by Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Neb.
1998), affd, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted in part, 68 U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S. Jan.
14, 2000) (No. 99-830); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A.65A-5 to -7 (West 1987 & Supp. 1999), found
unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Vernieo, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478 (D.N.J.
1998); S.B. 2254,56 Leg., Reg. Seas. Ch. 135 (N.D. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (Michie
1996 & Supp. 1999), found unconstitutional in Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore,
55 F. Supp. 2d 441 (E.D. Va. 1999). But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6721 (1998) (including a
health exception in its ban on partial birth abortions).
Additionally, laws that used to contain life or health exceptions are now being amended
to limit the exception to physical health or physical life endangerment situations, excluding
women's mental health concerns. Compare Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 103, 110 Stat. 3009-17 (1996) (including a life exception on a ban
for the use of federal funds to pay for abortions under the Medicaid program), with Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
Title V, §§ 508-509, 112 Stat. 2681-385 (1998) (narrowing life exception to instances in which
a woman's life is endangered by a physical condition); compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6721
(Supp. 1998) (containing a general health exception to a partial birth abortion ban), with
David Miles, House to Debate Late-term Abortion Bill, AP WIRE (Topeka, Kansas), Apr. 6,
1999, available in WESTLAW, APWIRESPLUS database (describing attempt to remove
mental health from health exception found in the Kansas law). This *attack upon the mental
health exception enables conservative policy-makers to appeal to deeply held suspicions
about the psychological fitness of women who refuse the role ofmotherhood.* Janet Benshoof
& Laura Ciolkowski, Abortion Foes Aim at Mental Health, N.J. L.J. Jan. 25, 1999, at 27,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Njlaw File.
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V.
Kohm and Holmes disagree with these worthy goals based on
their concept of morality, which, in turn, is based upon their
religious beliefs. This morality is one that rejects abortion specifi-
cally and female sexuality generally.' Through their article, the
authors attempt to impose their own religious structure on-others
by using inflammatory and unsupported rhetoric.
Their words strike a familiar refrain with me. During the
course of my work, I have determined that abortion is the key
component to the political strategy of the religious right-a strategy
that has as its goal the imposition of one particular view of morality
upon all." I make a clear distinction, however, between the
religious beliefs themselves and the attempts to make those
particular religious beliefs the basis of fundamental laws under
which we all must live.
Why is abortion the defining issue? There are two reasons.
First, abortion is the glue for a strong, active, one-issue minority
grassroots movement in which others who oppose abortion can join
even if these individuals and groups do not agree with the religious
right on other issues.
55
Second, abortion prompted the religious right to enlist the
Republican Party's aid in restoring morality to the nation. The
imprimatur of the Republican Party tends to mainstream the anti-
choice issue." Additionally, the association of the party with the
religious right has led to one of the most consistent and reliable
voting blocs within the Republican Party. This dependable
constituency has lead, in turn, to deference within the party to the
concerns of the religious right in matters ranging from who gets
elected, to who gets appointed to important posts, to policy matters
in the international family planning area.57
53. See supra note 29.
54. Although eliminating the right to choose abortion is the focus, for some, like Kohm
and Holmes, abortion is just one of a number of behaviors considered objectionable which
include contraception, extramarital sex, sex education, gay and lesbian rights, and
pornography (broadly defined). See CENTER FOR REPROD. LAW AND POLICY, TIPPING THE
SCALES 3, 8 (1998) [hereinafter TIPPING THE SCALES]; see also Kohm & Holmes, supra note
1, at 408-09 (condemning these behaviors as contrary to early feminists' goals).
55. See TIPPING THE SCALES, supra note 54, at 3, 31 n.22.
56. See id. at3.
57. See id. at 3,12,19,29 n.6. During the Reagan and Bush years, the Executive Branch
actively supported a Human Life Amendment to the Constitution beth as a piece of the
Republican platform and in Congress. The Human Life Amendment sought to overturn Roe
v. Wade. No other liberty right given protection by the Supreme Court has been subjected
to this type of legislative overruling. See id. at 3, 30 n.7.
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Because of the key role that abortion plays in this overall
strategy, finding a way to overturn Roe v. Wade has become the
most focused and best financed aspect of the morality campaign. As
a result, it also has been the most successful."5 The protection given
by the Supreme Court's 1973 decision of Roe v. Wade has been
seriously diluted since then by the efforts of the religious right in
the ensuing twenty-five years.
I am not referring to the protection of a right to abortion,
because that was never the basis of the Roe decision. Rather, Roe
v. Wade protected a woman's individual choice about whether to
continue a pregnancy free from governmental interference. 9 Roe
left that choice with the individual woman and her family. That
aspect of Roe has been overturned, for the government is no longer
under an obligation to act neutrally when it comes to a woman's
individual choice.'
Starting in 1983, the Solicitor General consistently asked the Supreme Court, in
cases in which he was appearing even if the federal government was not a defendant in the
case, to overturn Roe v. Wade. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8,
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744 and 91-
902) (filed by Solicitor General Kenneth Starr) (arguing that "Roe v. Wade was wrongly
decided and should be overruled"); Respondent's Brief at 13, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1990) (Nos. 89-1391 and 89-1392) (filed by Solicitor General Kenneth Starr) (arguing that
"the Court's conclusions in Roe that there is a fundamental right to an abortion... find[s]
no support in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution" and concluding that *[w]e
continue to believe that Roe was wrongly decided and should be overruled"); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 11-12, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1989) (Nos.
88-1125 and 88-1309) (filed by Solicitor General Kenneth Starr) (arguing that "[w]e continue
to believe that Roe was wrongly decided and should be overruled"); Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 24, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1985) (Nos. 84-495 and 84-1379) (filed by Acting Solicitor
General Charles Fried). Fried argued:
We respectfully submit that by these criteria Roe v. Wade is extraordinarily
vulnerable. It stands as a source of trouble in the law not only on its own
terms, but also because it invites confusion about the sources of judicial
authority and the direction of this Court's own future course. Stare decisis is
a principle of stability. A decision as flawed as we believe Roe v. Wade to be
becomes a focus of instability, and thus is less aptly sheltered by that doctrine
from criticism and abandonment.
Id. These actions carried with them the prestige of the office of the Solicitor General.
These are examples of the enormous power that the anti-choice movement has-a power that
can influence political culture and, ultimately, public opinion.
58. See TIPPING THE SCALES, supra note 54, at 19, 24-25.
59. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that "[flor the stage prior to
approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must
be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician").
60. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992)
(stating that tjhe woman's liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from the outset the
State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later point in fetal
development the State's interest in life has sufficient force so that the right of the woman to
terminate the pregnancy can be restricted); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980)
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Women who choose childbirth still have the full range of
constitutional protection. Women who choose abortion, however,
now have lesser constitutional protection. The government can tell
a woman contemplating abortion that her decision is wrong. The
government can make the woman's private doctor try to talk her
out of the decision. 2 In sum, the government can burden her choice
as long as that burden does not become something which is
"undue."6 Thus, now, the majority of the states have restrictions
on abortion that would not have been constitutional under Roe v.
Wade as it was decided in 1973."
The result is that a movement related to morality, which is
focused on politics and changing public opinion, has successfully
influenced the Supreme Court. The Court has accepted the
stereotype that women who choose abortion should be accorded less
constitutional protection because those women are not doing the
"God-based natural thing."
VI.
What is not understood is that this strategy to overturn Roe v.
Wade is still in place today. 5 In order to describe what the attack
(holding that the government can favor childbirth over abortion by covering childbirth
services under Medicaid and refusing to fund medically necessary abortions); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (declaring that the state can refuse to fund elective abortions for
indigent women while funding childbirth services).
61. See Casey, 605 U.S. at 881-87 (upholding requirement that, before performing an
abortion, physician must counsel patient with certain information developed by the state
which expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion).
62. See id.
63. See id. at 876-77. What is an 'undue burden"? The most conservative members of
the Court would say that an undue burden is nothing less than a complete obstacle to
abortion. See id. at 945 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (stating
that "our decision in Roe is not directly implicated by the Pennsylvania statute, which does
not prohibit, but simply regulates, abortion").
64. Compare City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(recognizing a legitimate state interest in both proscribing abortions post-viability and
protecting minors seeking abortions, but finding provisions requiring parental consent,
informed consent, twenty-four hour waiting periods, and a mandate for hospital treatment
for all second-trimester abortions unconstitutional), overruled by Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (finding informed consent, second
physician presence requirements, and degree of care provisions for post-viability abortions
unconstitutional), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992), with Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(holding "undue burden" standard, informed consent, twenty-four hour waiting period, and
parental consent provisions constitutional).
65. This strategy undeniablyoriginates from anti-choice forces, see generally TIPPINGTHE
SCALES, supra note 54, not from the pro-choice community as suggested by Kohm and
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on Roe currently is, I want to describe how this attack has changed
over time. In the mid-1970s, the attack on Roe was overt. Activists
tried to have the Supreme Court explicitly overrule Roe and also
tried to overturn Roe by amending the Constitution with a Human
Life Amendment, which would give fetuses (the unborn) the status
of born people and would give embryos the same rights as the
readers of this Essay."
'As previously indicated, the Republican Party has played an
important role in this strategy. In 1976, the Republican Party
adopted a platform calling for far reaching restrictions on
abortion-a platform that has been followed and promoted ever
since.' 7 The anti-choice plank of the Party's platform has four
pieces. First, starting in 1976 and continuing to this day, the
platform calls for the passage of a Human Life Amendment."5 In
Holmes. See Kohm & Holmes, supra note 1, at 404-05.
66. See TIPPING THE SCALES, supra note 54, at 3, 30 n.7.
67. See REPUBLICAN NATLCOMM.,THE REPuBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, PRINCIPLES OFTHE
1996 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, reprinted in 62 CONG. Q. ALMANAC D-21, D-28 (1996)
[hereinafter 1996 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM] ("reaffirming respect for 'the sanctity of
innocent human life'); REPUBLICAN NATL COMM., THE REPUBICAN PARTY PLATFORM 22
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM] ("We believe the unborn child has
a fundamental individual right to life which cannot be infringed.*); REPUBLICAN NATL
COMM., THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM-AN AMERICAN VISION: FOR OUR CHILDREN AND
OuRFuTuiRE 31 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 REPUBLICAN PARTYPLATFORM) ("Deep in our hearts,
we do believe... That the unborn child has a fundamental individual right to life which
cannot be infringed."); REPUBLICAN NATL COMM., THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM,
reprinted in 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 41-B, 55-B (1984) [hereinafter 1984 REPUBLICAN PARTY
PLATFORM] ("mhe unborn child has a fundamental individual right to life which cannot be
infringed."); REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, reprinted in 36
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 58-B, 62-B (1980) [hereinafter 1980 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM]
("There can be no doubt that the question of abortion, despite the complex nature of its
various issues, is ultimately concerned with equality of rights under the law. While we
recognize differing views on this question among Americans in general-and in our own
party-we affirm our support of a constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right
to life for unborn children."); REPUBLICAN NATL COMM., THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM,
reprinted in 2 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 965, 974 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 REPUBLICAN
PARTY PLATFORM] ("Because of our concern for family values, we affirm our beliefs, stated
elsewhere in this Platform, in many elements that will make our country a more hospitable
environment for family life [including) a position on abortion that values human life .... ").
68. See 1996 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 67, at D-28 ("The unborn child
has a fundamental individual right to life which cannot be infringed. We support a human
life amendment to the Constitution and we endorse legislation to make clear that the
Fourteenth Amendments protections apply to unborn children."); 1992 REPUBLICAN PARTY
PLATFORM, supra note 67, at 22 ("We therefore reaffirm our support for a human life
amendment to the Constitution and we endorse legislation to make clear that the Fourteenth
Amendments protections apply to unborn children.); 1988 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM,
supra note 67, at 31-32 ("We therefore reaffirm our support for a human life amendment to
the Constitution, and we endorse legislation to make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's
protections apply to unborn children."); 1984 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 67,
at 55-B ("We therefore reaffirm our support for a human life amendment to the Constitution,
438 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 6:423
the early 1980s, nineteen states called to convene constitutional
conventions on the topic.69
Second, the platform calls for federal legislation giving more
rights to the fetus.70 This, too, has been successful, as Congress has
passed legislation such as the ban on partial birth abortion71 and
the Unborn Victims of Violence Act.
2
Third, the platform calls for a ban on federal funding, not to
organizations that advocate abortion rights, but to organizations
that have something to do with abortion or whose affiliated
branches have something to do with abortion."3 This portion of the
platform also has been successful. Congress instituted both a
domestic gag rule by prohibiting health care professionals in
institutions receiving federal funds from talking about abortion7'
and an international gag rule by creating the so-called Mexico City
and we endorse legislation to make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections apply
to unborn children."); 1980 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 67, at 62-B ("[Wie
affirm our support of a constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right to life for
unborn children."); 1976 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 67, at 976 (-The
Republican Party favors a continuance of the public dialogue on abortion and supports the
efforts of those who seek enactment of a constitutional amendment to restore protection of
the right to life for unborn children.").
69. See Albert P. Blausten et al., Amici for Appellants: The Role of Stare Decisis in the
Reconsideration of Roe v. Wade, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 204, 208 (1989) ("[A]t least nineteen
state legislatures have passed petitions to convene a constitutional convention to propose a
human life amendment to the Constitution.").
70. See 1996 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 67, at D-28 ("[W]e endorse
legislation to make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections apply to unborn
children. Our purpose is to have legislative andjudicial protection of that right against those
who perform abortions."); 1992 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 67, at 22 ('[W]e
endorse legislation to make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections apply to
unborn children."); 1988 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 67, at 32 (same); 1984
REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 67, at 55-B (same).
71. Congress has passed two bills banning 'partial birth abortion," one in 1995 and one
in 1997. See H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1833,104th Cong. (1995). Both were vetoed
by President Clinton. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
72. H.R. 2436, 106th Cong. (1999) (passed House of Representatives on Sept. 30, 1999).
73. See 1996 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 67, at D-28 ("We oppose using
public revenues for abortion and will not fund organizations which advocate it."); 1992
REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 67, at 22 (same); 1988 REPUBLICAN PARTY
PLATFORM, supra note 67, at 32 ("We oppose the use of public revenues for abortion and will
eliminate funding for organizations which advocate or support abortion.); 1984 REPUBLICAN
PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 67, at 55-B (same); 1980 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra
note 67, at 62-B ("We also support the congressional efforts to restrict the use of taxpayers'
dollars for abortion.").
74. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.7, 59.8 (1988) (promulgating regulations of the Department of
Health and Human Services under the Public Health Service Act, §§ 1002,1008, as amended,
42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-8 (1988)). Although the gag rule was found constitutional, see Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), President Clinton suspended its operation in 1993. See
Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related Services in Family Planning Service Projects,
58 Fed. Reg. 7462, 7463 (1993).
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policy. 76 During the Reagan era, the Mexico City policy barred
organizations in countries that received U.S. aid from receiving
population assistance funds if the organizations used their own
funds to provide legal abortion services or if they participated-
consistent with their own laws-in efforts to alter laws or govern-
mental policies with any connection to abortion.7' Both bans,
domestic and international, were halted by President Clinton," not
by the Supreme Court, which upheld such gag rules.78 A modified
version of the Mexico City policy, however, has just been reinstitut-
ed this year in a compromise between President Clinton and anti-
choice members of Congress."
Legislation also has been passed banning the use of federal
Medicaid dollars for virtually all abortions, including medically
necessary abortions.8' Tied into the funding bans is legislation
prohibiting women in the military from receiving abortions from
their regular doctors"1 and barring federal employees and women
75. The Mexico City policy prohibited overseas NGOs from receiving U.S. funds,
either through USAID or indirectly through U.S.-based NGOs that received
U.S. funds, if, with their own funds and in accordance with their own laws, they
"performe[d]" or "actively promote[d]" "abortion as a method of family
planning." The name is derived from the fact that the U.S. announced the
policy at the 1984 U.N. International Conference on Population in Mexico City.
CENTER FOR REPROD. LAW AND Poucy, CAERO +6: A8ESSasO U.S. SUPPORT FOR
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AT HOME AND ABROAD 16 n.9 (1999) (quoting the Policy Statement
of the United States of America at the United Nations International Conference on
Population, 2nd Sess., Mexico City (Aug. 6-13, 1984)).
76. See id. at 4, 16 n.9.
77. See Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related Services of Family Planning
Service Projects, 58 Fed. Reg. at 7463.
78. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 203.
79. The modified proposal is found in the Fiscal Year 2000 Commerce, Justice, State and
the Judiciary Appropriations Bill. For further information on this proposal, see Center for
Reprod. Law and Policy, Press Release: United Nations Dues Paid, but Not Without a Price
(Nov. 15, 1999) <http'/www.crlp.org/111599UNdues.html>.
80. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title V, §§ 508-509, 112 Stat. 2681-385 (1998). Legislation of this type
has been enacted annually since 1976. See Planned Parenthood v. Engler, 73 F.3d 634,636
(6th Cir. 1996) (describing the enactment of this uncodified legislation, popularly known as
the Hyde Amendment, each year from 1976-1994, as a substantive modification of the
Medicaid program); New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841, 845 &
n. 1 (N.M. 1998) (describing how the Hyde Amendment has been enacted annually from 1994-
1998).
81. See 10 U.S.C. § 1093 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (prohibiting the use of Department of
Defense funds for abortions except if the life of the woman is endangered by the pregnancy
and prohibiting the performance of abortions in any medical facility run by the Department
of Defense except in cases of rape or incest or if the life of the woman is endangered by the
pregnancy).
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living on reservations from receiving abortion coverage from their
medical insurance.82  "'
Fourth, the platform calls for the appointment of judges who
believe in the sanctity of unborn life,83 and that is precisely what
has happened. Former Presidents Reagan and Bush appointed six
Supreme Court Justices, thus changing the viewpoint of the Court
with respect to reproductive rights."' For example, starting with
her appointment in 1983, Justice O'Connor advocated for the Court
to change Roe-to state that abortion is not a clearly fundamental
right."
VII.
Today, twenty-five years after Roe, the attack on Roe is much
more covert and sophisticated. Its attackers no longer use an
obvious and frontal strategy. The contours of the current attack
can be discerned from the increasing number of lawyersm and non-
82. See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
58, tit. 5, §§ 508-09, 113 Stat. 430 (1999) (restricting federal employees); 42 C.F.R. §§ 36.51-
36.57 (1999) (detailing restrictions on federal abortion options for Native American women
on reservations). No federal employee health benefit program can provide coverage for
abortions unless the pregnancy endangers the woman's life or is the result of rape or incest.
See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of2000§§509-10. Similarly, no
abortion may be performed at an Indian Health Services Facility or Program unless the
woman's life is endangered by the pregnancy. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 36.53-54, 36a.53-54.
83. See 1996 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 67, at D-28 ("We support the
appointment of judges who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent
human life."); 1992 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 67, at 22 ("We reaffirm our
support for the appointment ofjudges who respect traditional family values and the sanctity
of innocent human life.*); 1988 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 67, at 32 ("[W]e
reaffirm our support for the appointment ofjudges at all levels of the judiciary who respect
traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life."); 1984 REPUBLICAN PARTY
PLATFORM, supra note 67, at 55-B to 56-B (same).
84. Former Presidents Reagan and Bush appointed Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, and Thomas to the Supreme Court and appointed Justice Rehnquist to the position
of Chief Justice. By the end of Bush's term in office, the Supreme Court issued Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), in which Justice O'Connor
authored a plurality opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter reducing the standard
by which abortion regulations are analyzed from the "strict scrutiny" described in Roe v.
Wade to the "undue burden" standard. In her opinion, Justice O'Connor criticized and
overruled several decisions that had been issued by the Court post-Roe. See id. at 871, 882
(plurality opinion) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (criticizing various opinions following Roe).
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored a dissent in which White, Scalia, and Thomas joined
arguing that Roe v. Wade should be overruled. See ia at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
85. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 465 n.10 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the nature of the fundamental right to abortion
is a "limited" one).
86. Many of these lawyers receive their training at Regent University Law School where
Kohm teaches. Founded in 1986, and accredited in 1996, Regent University is a self-
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profit groups formed to do legislative and policy work to counter
reproductive choice, namely abortion. In the last ten years, the
number of such groups rose from two to over eighteen. 7 Currently,
annual funding for these legal advocacy groups totals about forty
million dollars."
According to the anti-choice groups themselves, this covert
siege of Roe seeks to cause an inner erosion of the decision, thus
allowing the government to inflict mortal wounds without ever
saying that Roe is being overturned. To accomplish their task, the
anti-choice legal advocacy groups focus on three things: (1) the
fetus itself, (2) the expansion of states' legitimate interest in the
abortion decision, and (3) regulations purportedly outlawing late-
term abortions.8 9 Also, to achieve their goals, anti-choice advocates
must overcome two major legal concepts that bar much of their
proposed legislation: the viability line"c and the requirement of a
health exception. 9'
A covert strategy is, by its nature, more elusive to counter and
has, at times, caught the pro-choice community unprepared. A
prime example of the covert strategy at work is the "partial birth
abortion" legislation that began to be introduced in Congress and
state legislatures in 1995.92
The "partial birth abortion" legislation is a sophisticated piece
of criminal legislation drafted in part by the National Right to Life
Committee (NRLC).93 The legislation has been passed by Congress
twice," only to be vetoed by President Clinton. 5 Legislatures
passed similar measures in thirty states." Each bill criminalizes
described evangelical Christian institution whose mission is "to bring to bear upon legal
education and the legal profession the will of almighty God, our Creator." TIPPING THE
SCALES, supra note 54, at 22 (quoting REGENT UNIVERSITY GRADUATE CATALOG, 1994-96, at
128). The end goal is to train lawyers "to change the course of human history." Id. (quoting
evangelist Peter Marshall, Jr.). Regent University is closely associated with the American
Center for Law and Justice, one of the newest, largest, and best-funded anti-choice law firms.
See id. at 22-23.
87. See id. at 7-9, 30 n.18 (listing many of these non-profit groups).
88. See id. at 24.
89. See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
90. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (defining the viability point as the
moment when the fetus has a reasonable chance of survival outside the womb, before which
a woman has a right to terminate her pregnancy).
91. See i& (stating that, at any time during her pregnancy, a woman is entitled to
terminate her pregnancy in order to preserve her own health); see also supra note 52.
92. For examples of such laws, see supra note 52.
93. See TIPPINGTHE SCALES, supra note 54, at 121 (detailing how the NRLC worked with
Republican legislators in drafting partial birth abortion legislation).
94. See H.B. 1122, 105th Cong. (1997); H.B. 1833, 104th Cong. (1995).
95. See TIPPING THE SCALES, supra note 54, at 126.
96. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6721 (Supp. 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.720, .765,
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performing an abortion upon a "partially born" fetus97 with
penalties as high as life imprisonment for a doctor who performs
this so-called procedure.9" Only two of the bans contain an
exception for the health of the mother," and none of the bans serve
any legitimate state interest recognized by the Supreme Court.
10o
.990 (Lexis Supp. 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.300 (West Supp. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. §§
41-41-71, -73 (1997); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15 (Banks-Baldwin 1997 & Supp. 1998),
declared unconstitutional in Women's Med. Prof. Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.
Ohio 1995), affd, 103 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 623 U.S. 1036 (1998); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 684 (West Supp. 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-85 (West Supp. 1998); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-27 to-33 (Lexis 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-209 (1997); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (1999); WiS. STAT. ANN. §§ 896.038, 940.16 (West Supp. 1999); see
also supra note 52.
97. See supra notes 52-96.
98. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.50(3Xa), 940.16(2) (West Supp. 1999) (imposing penalty
of life imprisonment on any doctor who performs a "partial birth abortion").
99. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6721 (Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5(2Xa)
(1999).
100. The Supreme Court recognizes only two legitimate state interests which may be used
to justify abortion restrictions, as long as the restrictions do not impose an undue burden on
the right to an abortion-maternal health and potentiality of life. See Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64
(1973). Bans on "partial birth abortions" do not serve either interest. The bans prohibit
doctors from using a procedure that they deem safest for particular women. A statute that
imposes increased risks on the woman seeking an abortion does not serve any state interest
in maternal health. Cf Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493,1502-06 (10th Cir. 1995) (striking
post-viability choice of method ban), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leavitt v. Jane L., 520
U.S. 1274 (1997); Summit Med. Assocs. v. James, 984 F. Supp. 1404, 1457-59 (M.D. Ala.
1998) (same), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Summit Med. Assocs. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d
1326 (11th Cir. 1999), rehearing en banc denied, 196 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 1999), petition for
cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1999) (No. 99-1041). Additionally, banning a
particular procedure when others remain available serves no interest in potential life and
does not influence women's decisions on whether or not to abort. Thus, such bans are
unconstitutional. See Carhartv. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142,1145 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted
in part, 68 U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2000) (No. 99-830); Little Rock Family Planning
Servs. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 797 (8th Cir. 1999); Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa v.
Miller, 195 F.3d 386, 388-89 (8th Cir. 1999); Women's Med. Profl Corp. v. Voinovich, 130
F.3d 187,200-02 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 623 U.S. 1036 (1998) (No. 97-934); Rhode Island
Med. Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288,304-05 (D.R.I. 1999); Causeway Med. Suite v.
Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 613-14 (E.D. La. 1999); Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v.
Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478,493-94 (D.N.J. 1998); A Choice for Women v. Butterworth, 54
F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1154-66 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1033-34
(W.D. Ky. 1998); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 55 F. Supp. 2d 441,475 (E.D.
Va. 1999); Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz., Inc. v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1378 (D. Ariz.
1997); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1316-17 (E.D. Mich. 1997). But see Hope Clinic
v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 865, 871 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that injunctions on "partial-birth
abortion" statutes were premature as they could be interpreted in a manner that was not
unconstitutionally vague and that prohibitions on dilation and extraction (D & X) abortion
procedures, even without a health exception, do not unduly burden the right to abortion),
vacating 995 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1998), stay denied, 197 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 1999), petition
for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (Nos. 99-1152, 99-1156).
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I want to focus, however, on the viability point. The supporters
of -the ban claim, to politicians and to the public, that the ban
reaches only a type of procedure that is performed on viable
fetuses.1 ' 1 They put a lot of money and effort into barraging the
public with images of near-term perfect babies abruptly and
needlessly aborted."0 2 Yet only two of the bans are limited to post-
viability procedures."3 All other bans proscribe some type of
procedure performed on non-viable fetuses.'04
This campaign has been conceived of by anti-choice legal groups
who decided the best way to erode the core of the constitutional
protections of Roe is to focus the public on late abortion and then
draft legislation that undermines Roe's guarantees without any
reference to late abortion. These advocates never admit that they
are attempting to corrupt Roe.
The intent to impair Roe becomes clear, however, when
examining how these types of bans are defended. In lawsuits
challenging the bans, states and anti-choice activists argue that
these bans are not about procedures within the scope of Roe. This
assertion is premised on their further argument that there are
three types of people in this world-the unborn, the fully born, and
the partially born. They argue that Roe covers only the unborn.'0 "
What these laws really do, therefore, is give rights to fetuses-
any fetus that is "partially born--at all stages of pregnancy, and
they do so in a covert way that does not acknowledge that the laws
seek to change the Constitution to favor the rights of fetuses over
the rights of women. This tactic is much worse than the earlier
frontal attacks on Roe that were honest about their intent, such as
the Human Life Amendments of the early 1980s. The honesty of
these earlier attempts permitted the American public to easily
understand that the Amendments were wrong.
101. See TIPPING THE SCALES, supra note 54, at 121.
102. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Abortion Issue Raises Red Flags, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
1999, at 24 (describing how some ads in support of Maine's partial birth abortion ballot
initiative were rejected by television stations because they deceptively "left the impression
that abortions routinely involved healthy late-term fetuses"); Paul Carrier, Absentee Ballots
May Lift Turnout, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Nov. 2, 1999, at 1A, available in 1999 WL
26287620 (estimating that one million dollars was spent by each side in campaigning for
Maine's partial birth abortion ballot initiative); Marie Cocco, Psst: Don't Tell the Voters They
Are Nincompoops, NEWSDAY, Nov. 11, 1999, at A57, available in 1999 WL 8197966
(describing referendum campaign seeking to ban partial birth abortion in Maine).
103. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6721; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5.
104. See supra notes 51, 95.
105. See, e.g., Brief of State Appellants at 70-73, Carhart v. Stenbrg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th
Cir. 1999) (Nos. 98-3245, 98-3300).
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Partial birth abortion bans completely disrespect any rule of
law. These bans are the very antithesis of the constitutional liberty
guarantees of Roe. In Roe, the Supreme Court stated that a fetus
is not a person "within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment."" e The Court in Roe came to this conclusion after
analyzing the use of the word "person" in the Constitution. The
Court found that "the use of the word [person] is such that it has
application only postnatally. [No use of the word in the Constitu-
tion) indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible
prenatal application.1 7 "Postnatal," of course, means "after
birth;"1° prenatal means "before birth."' °9 Therefore, under Roe,
personhood attaches only after birth. These bans seek to overturn
this aspect of Roe.
In defending these bans, states and activists also suggest that
the bans serve a laundry list of state interests including"preventing
unacceptable disrespect for potential human life; ... preventing
cruelty to unborn children; preserving the integrity of the medical
profession; maintaining a civilized society; ... promoting public
safety, health, morals, and the public welfare;.., and preventing
brutality, barbarism, atrocities and depravity.""0
Yet, the Supreme Court in Roe held that the state has only two
legitimate interests that it can use to justify abortion regulations:
the interest in protecting maternal health and the interest in
potential life."' In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v. Casey,"2 the Supreme Court reaffirmed this limited number
of interests upon which a state may rely."' Again these bans seek
to overturn Roe and Casey as they relate to the permissible
justifications for abortion restrictions.
In sum, the "partial birth abortion" ban is not legislation
thoughtfully drafted because of abortion abuse, the imperiled safety
of women, or even because there is some new kind of abortion
technique that is particularly gruesome or awful. Rather, it is a
concerted public relations campaign to confuse the public, to scare
politicians, and to focus attention away from the woman to the
fetus. As bizarre as the whole "partial birth" discussion has been,
it has desensitized legislators and courts to the next wave of
106. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
107. Id. at 157 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
108. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 910 (10th ed. 1993).
109. I& at 920.
110. Brief of State Appellants at 46, Carhart (Nos. 98-3245, 98-3300).
111. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63; see also supra note 100.
112. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
113. See id. at 877-78.
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proposed legislation that would accord constitutional personhood to
fetuses and would not advance any legitimate state interest
recognized by the Supreme Court. Thus, desensitization is a
political victory for anti-choice forces--an end in itself.
VIII.
The final question is what should be the pro-choice commu-
nity's response. As part of the above-described public relations
campaign by anti-choice activists, the pro-choice community is
portrayed as extreme, radical, unwilling to compromise, immoral,
not religious, and selfish-names echoed by Kohm and Holmes in
their article. On the other hand, anti-choice activists portray
themselves as moderates.
Our response must be to expose their agenda as extreme, as
deceptive, and as unconstitutional. Earlier attempts such as the
Human Life Amendments honestly acknowledge that these drafters
wanted to give fetuses certain rights. We must demonstrate that
current attempts are merely Human Life Amendments in disguise.
They are giving fetuses rights and interests contrary to the
woman's interests throughout pregnancy and in contradiction to
Roe.
Second, the pro-choice community must not be defeatist and
defensive about abortion. We must acknowledge the wave of the
future, which will be found in proposals such as the partial birth
abortion bans, and confront the fact that such proposals are not
going away. The pro-choice community has not been countering the
bans with helpful suggestions that would change the playing field.
Instead we have been countering with proposed legislation that
joins them on their playing field. We must abandon that tact and
engage in affirmative campaigns that change the public discourse
on abortion. Rather than allowing pro-choice legislators to
introduce their own bans on post-viability abortions, we should
encourage such legislators to expose these anti-choice laws for what
they are. We must focus on questions such as why we are not
overturning the bans of spending federal funds for medically-
necessary abortions for Medicaid recipients and why we are not
demanding access to abortion, even life-saving abortions, for women
overseas. We must change the playing field, we must change the
dialogue.
Third, the pro-choice community must shift the focus back to
the women-the fully born. We should start having a dialogue
about legislation that would really help women. We must reclaim
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what is rightfully ours-the moral high ground and women's
conscience choice.
In sum, we must not give up in the face of an increasingly
successful campaign to overturn Roe and a woman's right to choose
an abortion, as Kohm and Holmes suggest. Instead, we must
redouble our efforts in order to protect this fundamental right that
is, contrary to Kohm and Holmes assertions, an integral part of,
and not a detraction from, women's freedom.
